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Abstract—QUIC is a secure transport protocol that improves
the performance of HTTPS. An initial QUIC handshake that
enforces a strict validation of the client’s source address requires
two round-trips. In this work, we extend QUIC’s address valida-
tion mechanism by an out-of-band validation token to save one
round-trip time during the initial handshake. The proposed token
allows sharing an address validation between the QUIC server
and trusted entities issuing these tokens. This saves a round-
trip time for the address validation. Furthermore, we propose
distribution mechanisms for these tokens using DNS resolvers
and QUIC connections to other hostnames. Our proposal can save
up to 50% of the delay overhead of an initial QUIC handshake.
Furthermore, our analytical results indicate that 363.6ms in total
can be saved for all connections required to retrieve an average
website, if a round-trip time of 90ms is assumed.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper investigates the design of the QUIC proto-
col [12], which is currently standardized. It is a secure
transport protocol designed to replace TLS over TCP within
the upcoming HTTP/3 version [3]. As the world wide web is
closely tied to the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and the
standardization work on QUIC receives widespread support,
we expect the QUIC protocol to be widely deployed on the
Internet within the next years.
The majority of web traffic consists of short-lived connec-
tions, for which the connection establishment represents a sig-
nificant delay overhead [13]. QUIC’s initial handshake requires
two round trips to establish the connection. One round-trip ac-
counts for the cryptographic connection establishment and the
other for a challenge-response mechanism known as stateless
retry, which validates the source address claimed by the client
to prevent IP spoofing attacks. Moreover, QUIC provides zero
round-trip time handshakes for resumed sessions. This allows
clients to send encrypted requests directly without waiting for
the server’s first handshake messages.
To further improve the performance of QUIC’s initial hand-
shake, we propose a mechanism to save one additional round
trip by outsourcing the address validation mechanism.
To illustrate the basic idea, we assume a website
(google.com) that trusts a DNS resolver (Google DNS) to
issue address validation tokens. Thus, if a client resolves
google.com at Google DNS, it also retrieves a valid token
for its source address. Subsequently, the client includes this
out-of-band validation token in its connection request sent to
google.com. Later, the web server validates that the presented
token matches the claimed source address of the client. If
so, the address validation is completed and in total, a round-
trip time has been saved. To put this into perspective, a
typical round-trip time is below 45ms in North America and
below 90ms for transatlantic connections [22]. Nonetheless,
some regions in the world suffer from high network latencies,
often exceeding 300ms [8]. Thus, a saved round-trip time
has a significant impact on the performance of the connection
establishment.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
• We propose out-of-band validation tokens that enable a
shared address validation between a QUIC server and
trusted entities issuing such tokens.
• We propose mechanisms to distribute out-of-band valida-
tion tokens via DNS resolvers and other QUIC connec-
tions.
• We demonstrate the performance improvements gained
by out-of-band validation tokens. Our results indicate that
our proposal saves up to 50% of the delay overhead
of initial QUIC connection establishments. Furthermore,
the distribution of out-of-band tokens via DNS resolvers
allows saving a round-trip time for almost all of the
connections required to load an average website.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Sec-
tion II introduces QUIC’s stateless retry and describes the
performance problems of QUIC’s connection establishment
that we aim to solve. Section III summarizes the proposed out-
of-band validation token. Evaluation results and a discussion
of our proposal are presented in Section IV. Related work is
reviewed in Section V. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, we review the stateless retry mechanism as
known from IETF QUIC [12]. Subsequently, we introduce the
performance problem of QUIC’s source address validation that
we aim to solve.
A. Stateless retry
QUIC servers can optionally include a challenge-response
mechanism in the handshake to validate the client’s source
address before proceeding with the cryptographic connection
establishment. In the following, we first describe the protocol
flow of this mechanism, which is known as a stateless retry
within the QUIC terminology. Subsequently, we present details
on the generation of address validation tokens.
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Fig. 1. Schematic of QUIC’s stateless retry during an initial connection
establishment.
a) Protocol flow: Figure 1 provides an overview of
a stateless retry during a client’s connection attempt. The
client starts the connection attempt by sending a ClientHello
message. In case of a stateless retry, the server responds with
a retry packet that contains an address validation token. Upon
receiving the server’s response, the client must repeat the
received token when resending its ClientHello message. This
mechanism allows the server to validate the client’s source
address. However, this mechanism increases the delay of the
connection establishment by a round-trip time. Note, that a
server can abort the connection establishment if, during a
stateless retry, a received token does not validate the claimed
IP address.
b) Token generation: The draft of the QUIC protocol
does not suggest a specific mechanism to implement the
generation of tokens because the server creating this token
is also consuming it. These tokens should be difficult to guess
and should not allow a network observer to link several QUIC
connections to the same client [19].
For example, these tokens can be constructed using a
Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) based on
SHA-256 [9]. Basically, the HMAC function depends on a
secret key and the client’s IP address, while the token is the
(truncated) HMAC value. To avoid that the same token is
issued repeatedly, the client’s IP address can be concatenated
with a cryptographic nonce in the HMAC function. How-
ever, to successfully validate such HMAC values, the used
nonce must be encoded in the token presented by clients.
Furthermore, an identifier for the used secret key can be
appended to the token to facilitate key management. Note, that
the computation of HMACs requires around 10 CPU cycles
per byte of input data [23]. Thus, off-the-shelf server CPU’s
can usually construct several ten thousands or even hundred
thousand validation tokens per second.
This mechanism of source address validation is called
stateless because the server is not required to keep state about
issued tokens but only needs to know the algorithm for the
token creation and the secret key to validate a presented
token. By sharing this secret key among a group of servers, a
validation of token can be performed by a member of this
group that did not issue the token itself. For example, a
stateless retry can request the client to conduct the handshake
with another server instance for the purpose of load-balancing.
In this case, the other server needs the used secret key to
validate that the presented token matches the claimed source
address.
c) Address validation for future connections: To allow
a strict address validation without causing a retry and an
additional round-trip, the QUIC server can issue tokens via
the new token frame over an already established connection.
The client caches this token for use in future connections. If
the client wishes to establish a new connection to the same
server, it includes the cached token within its initial message.
Upon receiving the client’s initial message, the server validates
that the presented token matches the claimed source address. If
this is the case, the server accepts the claimed source address
as validated and proceeds with the cryptographic connection
establishment. In total, this practice saves a round-trip time
compared to the source address validation using a stateless
retry.
B. Performance limitations of QUIC’s address validation
A stateless retry increases the delay overhead of the con-
nection establishment by a round-trip time. Validation tokens
for future connections solve this problem for all revisits to the
same hostname. However, these tokens are not available for
the first connection establishment to a specific hostname. Fur-
thermore, a presented validation token for future connections
can be invalid if it expired or the client’s source address (as
seen by the server) changed in the meantime. Upon receiving
such an invalid token, the server responds with a stateless retry
if the address validation is required before proceeding with
the cryptographic connection establishment. Thus, there are
several situations in which a stateless retry is likely to occur
during the establishment of a connection. Each time this leads
to a performance penalty of a round-trip time.
Note, that on average the retrieval of a website requires
about 20 connections to different hostnames [20]. This in-
dicates, that web browsing causes a large number of short-
lived connections for which the connection establishment
can present a significant overhead. Furthermore, websites on
average require four sequential connection establishment for
their retrieval because downloaded resources often trigger new
connections to different hostnames [20]. Assuming, that the
triggering and triggered connections saved a round-trip during
their address validation, then the loading of a website can save
more than a round-trip time to complete.
III. OUT-OF-BAND VALIDATION TOKEN
This section introduces the out-of-band validation token for
the QUIC protocol. Subsequently, distribution mechanisms for
such out-of-band tokens are proposed using DNS resolvers and
QUIC connections to other hostnames.
A. Token design
Address validation tokens present a defense mechanism
against source address spoofing by malicious clients. For this
purpose, the QUIC server compares the claimed client address
with the previously observed source address encoded in the
presented token. So far, only QUIC servers themselves can
issue address validation tokens for their connections. Out-of-
band validation tokens extend this mechanism by allowing
external entities to issue these tokens.
The generation of these token follows a similar approach as
described in Section II-A. Thus, the QUIC server is required
to share instructions and a secret key with the corresponding
external entity, that allow the generation of valid out-of-band
tokens for the client’s source address. Upon receiving an out-
of-band token, the client imports it in its cache, marks it
as received by an external entity, and associates the QUIC
server’s hostname to it. To establish a fresh connection to the
respective hostname, the client includes a cached token in the
send initial packet. If the client’s cache contains several tokens,
the client must prefer the usage of validation tokens received
by the QUIC server itself over cached out-of-band tokens.
The server may share different secret keys with different
external entities. This approach allows a selected invalidation
of tokens that have been issued using a specific secret key.
Thus, the QUIC server can revoke the secret key provided
to an external entity if, e.g., a large number of unrequited
connection requests is observed that use tokens issued by the
same key. If a setup with dedicated secret keys per external
entity is deployed, it is recommended to attach an identifier to
the token, that indicates which key was used to generate the
specific token.
Note, that according to the draft of IETF QUIC [12] the
server treats an invalid token as if the client did not present
a token. Thus, the number of required round-trips during the
connection establishment is identical if the client presents an
invalid out-of-band token or the client’s connection request
does not contain a token at all.
B. Token distribution mechanisms
To substantiate the real-world benefit of out-of-band tokens,
we present in this section two distribution mechanisms for
such tokens. First, we introduce the distribution via the Do-
main Name System (DNS). Then, we describe a distribution
mechanism using QUIC connections to other hostnames for
this purpose.
a) Distribution via DNS resolver: To save a round-trip
time via the proposed out-of-band tokens, the client needs to
receive the token before sending the connection request to
the corresponding QUIC server. Furthermore, clients query a
domain name to look up the source address before they send
their connection request. Thus, DNS seems to be a suitable
place to distribute out-of-band tokens as the connection request
often directly follows the corresponding DNS lookup. Figure 2
provides a schematic of this proposed distribution mechanism.
This proposal is not limited to a specific DNS standard and
can be applied to the traditional DNS [15] and newer versions
deploying transport encryption such as DNS over Transport
Layer Security (DOT) [11] and DNS over HTTPS (DOH) [10].
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Fig. 2. Proposed connection establishment avoiding stateless retry by using
a DNS resolver to issue validation token.
In general, the DNS protocol needs to be extended by a new
record type, which we define as QUICTOKEN.
If the client wishes to establish a fresh QUIC connection to
a domain name for which it has not a cached token for future
connections available, it queries the domain name (including
the QUICTOKEN record type) as shown in Figure 2. The DNS
resolver proceeds with the default resolution of the source
address associated with the domain name. Additionally, if the
DNS resolver supports the record type QUICTOKEN and is
capable to generate valid out-of-band tokens for this queried
domain name, it can include such a token in the response sent
to the client.
Note, that to construct valid out-of-band tokens, the resolver
needs to be trusted by the server hosting the specific domain
name. Thus, the respective server operator shared in advance
the instructions and the secret keys required to generate valid
tokens for this domain.
Upon receiving the source address and the token, the client
constructs its QUIC connection request and attach the obtained
out-of-band token to it before sending it to the received
server source address. Subsequently, the server validates the
presented token and proceeds with its normal connection
establishment.
To ensure that clients do not reuse tokens across different
connections, it is required that the record type QUICTOKEN
must not be cached except by the client. This can be realized
by setting the Time to Live (TTL) of the QUICTOKEN
record type to zero seconds. Note, that the DNS specification
explicitly allows TTL of zero seconds [7]. Furthermore, that
the DNS specification [7] allows each record type to have
its own TTL. As a result, this configuration of QUICTOKEN
does not affect the caching mechanisms of for example A or
AAAA record types.
A limitation of this distribution mechanism arises if the
DNS resolver is located within the same private network as
the client. In this case, the client’s source address as seen
by the DNS resolver might mismatch the publicly visible
source address as seen by the QUIC server. Thus, the address
validation is likely to fail because the source address encrypted
in the token does not match the claimed source address as
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Fig. 3. Proposed distribution mechanism using the QUIC connection to
hostname A to receive an out-of-band token valid for hostname B.
observed by the QUIC server. This issue can be solved by for
example moving the DNS resolver to a public IP address or
using STUN [14] to learn the client’s public source address.
The computational overhead introduced to the DNS resolver
when constructing out-of-band validation tokens presents an-
other limitation of our proposal. Large connection-oriented
DNS can have about 24K active connections and serve up to
230k queries per second [24]. Thus, it seems beneficial to use
a lightweight mechanism for constructing these tokens such as
the discussed HMAC functions (see Section II-A b)). However,
widespread mechanisms such as EDNS Client Subnet [6] or
Round-robin DNS [4] also cause an increased overhead for
DNS resolvers to realize performance optimizations.
b) Distribution via other QUIC connections: This distri-
bution mechanism assumes that the client first establishes a
QUIC connection to hostname A before it sends a connection
request to hostname B. Furthermore, we assume that hostname
B allows hostname A to issue valid out-of-band tokens for its
service and therefore shares instructions and its secret key re-
quired to construct these tokens for arbitrary source addresses.
We propose a new EXTERNAL TOKEN frame for the QUIC
protocol, which allows QUIC servers to provide clients with
out-of-band tokens for arbitrary hostnames. However, tokens
for future connections to the same hostname A should use the
existing NEW TOKEN frame. Note, that tokens for future
connections are regarded as trustworthy as they are issued by
the same server which is also consuming them. However, out-
of-band tokens are not treated as trustworthy because the client
does not validate that the entity issuing these tokens is autho-
rized to do so. Compared to the NEW TOKEN frame of the
QUIC protocol, tokens received via the EXTERNAL TOKEN
frame are only used to establish a fresh connection if the
client would otherwise send the connection request without
an attached address validation token.
Figure 3 shows a schematic of this distribution mechanism.
The client has an established QUIC connection to hostname A.
Hostname A reasons based upon its provided response, that the
client is likely to establish a connection to hostname B. This
is for example the case, if the provided response contains a
hyperlink to a resource hosted by hostname B. To speed up this
connection establishment between the client and hostname B,
hostname A decides to provide an out-of-band token for the
client’s source address valid for hostname B.
Upon receiving this EXTERNAL TOKEN frame from host-
name A, the client checks first if it has a token for future
connections for hostname B. If not, the client establishes a
fresh connection to hostnames B by attaching the received out-
of-band token to its connection request. Otherwise, the client
will prefer to include its cached token for future connections
(received in a previous connection to the hostname B) in the
connection request to hostname B. Upon receiving the client’s
connection request, hostname B validates the included address
validation token and proceeds with the usual connection es-
tablishment.
It seems reasonable to expect that a QUIC server will
only issue out-of-band tokens for other hostnames for which
it is likely that the client will soon connect to them. Out-
of-band tokens should have an expiration mechanism, thus
received tokens may expire if no connection is established
to a corresponding hostname within a short period.
IV. EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION
To demonstrate the feasibility of our proposal, we evaluate
and discuss aspects of its performance, security, privacy, and
scalability.
A. Performance
In this section, we present a performance evaluation for out-
of-band tokens. First, we describe our results with respect to
the establishment of a single QUIC connection. Subsequently,
we evaluate the performance impact of our proposal on an
average website visit.
a) Benefits for single connections: Using an out-of-band
token to validate the client’s source address saves a round-
trip compared to using a stateless retry. Figure 4 shows
QUIC’s initial handshake where the client presents an out-
of-band token within the initial packets sent to the server. In
case of a valid token, the server directly proceeds with the
cryptographic handshake by sending its ServerHello message.
The cryptographic handshake follows the TLS 1.3 protocol.
Thus, the server uses transport encryption to transmit its
Encrypted Extensions (EE), Certificate (CERT), Certificate
Verify (CV) and Handshake Finished (FIN) messages. In
total, it requires only a single round-trip from the ClientHello
until the client transmits its own FIN message and is ready
to send encrypted application data. As the QUIC protocol
is still work in progress, only experimental implementations
of its design exist. Thus, we will use an analytical model
to approximate the performance benefit of our proposal on
the delay overhead of the connection establishment. For this
evaluation, we approximate the delay overhead for the initial
connection establishment as shown in Equations 1 and 2.
Here, tDefault and tProposal indicate the delay overhead for the
current status quo and our proposal, respectively. Furthermore,
RTT denotes the round-trip time between both peers and tproc
Client Server
ServerHello, Crypto{EE, CER
T, CV, FIN},
[Application Data]
Crypto{FIN}, [Application Data]
regular QUIC data
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Fig. 4. Initial QUIC connection establishment using previously retrieved
out-of-band validation token.
marks the total time required by the peers to process the
connection establishment.
tDefault(RTT ) = tproc + 2 ∗RTT (1)
tProposal(RTT ) = tproc +RTT (2)
Within our analytical model, we assume that the processing of
the connection setup tproc takes 40ms independently of the
round-trip time. We chose 40ms because this approximates
the time by the TLS 1.3 over TCP protocol stack for a similar
task [20].
Figure 5 plots the delay overhead of the initial handshake
over the round-trip time for our analytical model. We find,
that the green, dashed line indicating our proposal provides
significantly better results than QUIC’s status quo marked by
a red, dotted plot. The performance improvement achieved by
our proposal depends on the RTT. Assuming a transatlantic
connections with a round-trip time of 90ms [22], we find
that a connection establishment using our proposal requires
only 60% of the default delay overhead. Furthermore, we
derive from Equation 1 and 2 that our proposal reduces the
investigated delay overhead by 50% when RTT converges to
infinity.
b) Gains for web browsing: As the QUIC protocol will
be a building block of the upcoming HTTP/3 network protocol,
it seems interesting to evaluate the performance impact of
our proposal on website retrieval. A recent study reported,
that the retrieval of popular websites requires on average
20.24 encrypted connections to different hostnames [20]. For
this evaluation, we assume that all of these hostnames support
the QUIC protocol and that they all enable the client’s DNS
resolver to issue out-of-band tokens. Thus, we find that we can
save a round-trip time during each connection establishment
if the corresponding web server enforces a strict source
address validation before proceeding with the cryptographic
handshake.
Furthermore, it is found by [20], that the average popular
website requires up to 4.04 sequentially established connec-
tions. This finding can be attributed to the fact, that a retrieved
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Fig. 5. This plot shows the simulated delay overhead of QUIC’s initial
connection establishment over the round-trip time. The red, dotted line plots
QUIC’s default behavior and the green, dashed line deploys our proposed
out-of-band validation tokens.
web resource often triggers the establishment of additional
connections to retrieve further resources. Thus, saving a round-
trip time via the proposed out-of-band tokens allows in total to
save on average 4.04 round-trips until all required connections
are established. Assuming a round-trip time of 90ms, as
it is typical for transatlantic connections [22], we find that
363.6ms can be saved until the last connection for retrieving
the website is established.
B. Security
In this section, we review possible security concerns with
respect to out-of-band validation tokens. First, we address the
impact of our proposal on the mitigation of Denial-of-Service
attacks. Then, we look at risks arising from using address
validation tokens from possibly unauthorized origins.
a) Denial-of-Service attacks: By sharing the instructions
and the secret keys to generate address validation tokens
with other entities, the risk that this confidential information
gets compromised increases. In case of a compromise, an
adversary can issue tokens for arbitrary source addresses.
Thus, the adversary can send connection requests with a
spoofed source address to the QUIC server, that contain a
valid token for the claimed address. As a result, the server
experiences a large number of spoofed connection requests
that consume its available resources up to a Denial-of-Service
attack. To mitigate such an event, the server should monitor
connection requesrs associated with trusted secret keys. If the
number of spoofed connection requests exceeds a threshold,
the server revokes that specific secret key to mitigate Denial-
of-Service attacks. After such a revocation all tokens issued
by this key are treated as invalid. However, the revocation of
a secret key might also cause a stateless retry for legitimate
connection requests and thus causes a performance degradation
for these connection attempts. To address this security versus
performance tradeoff, it is advised to provide different secret
keys to different entities. Thus, a revoked key affects only
validation tokens expected to be issued by a specific entity.
In total, key revocation provides an effective mechanism to
protect against the considered Denial-of-Service attacks.
b) Unauthorized origins: In our proposal, the client does
not validate whether an external entity is authorized by the
affected QUIC server to issue out-of-band tokens. Thus, it is
necessary to review the case in which an unauthorized external
entity issues invalid out-of-band tokens. The draft of IETF
QUIC [12] instructs that servers treat invalid tokens (for future
connections) as if the client did not present a token at all.
Therefore, the client experiences no drawbacks by presenting
an invalid out-of-band validation token and in total, the client
does achieve the same performance as including no token in
the connection request. However, if the client has a valid token
for future connections and an invalid out-of-band token from
an unauthorized origin in its cache, then only a connection
request including the token for future connections can save
a round-trip during the address validation. Concluding, tokens
for future connections are more trustworthy, as they have been
retrieved via an authenticated connection to the respective
QUIC server. For this reason, the usage of tokens for future
connections should be preferred over out-of-band validation
tokens because clients do not validate that a trust-relation
between the entity issuing the out-of-band tokens and the
QUIC server consuming them exists. However, out-of-band
tokens are preferential compared to using no token at all,
as they can reduce the delay overhead of the connection
establishment by up to a round-trip time but always achieve
at least the performance of a handshake without a token.
C. Privacy
QUIC’s address validation tokens can be used to link the
connection in which the token was issued to the future connec-
tion in which the same token is presented by the client [19].
The proposed out-of-band token allows the same correlation
across both connections in which the corresponding token is
exchanged. However, in the case of out-of-band tokens, the
entity issuing the token might differ from the one to whom it is
presented to during the connection request. Thus, the privacy
aspects of the proposed token are different from the known
address validation token for future connections as it allows
linking user activities across different entities. To evaluate
the privacy impact of our proposal, we first investigate the
distribution of tokens via DNS resolvers. Subsequently, we
review the issuing of out-of-band tokens via QUIC connections
to other hostnames.
a) Distribution via DNS resolvers: First of all, we find
that the described correlations of a client’s connections are
only feasible if the involved entities collude with each other
with the aim to track a client’s online activities. We note,
that a collusion between a DNS resolver and a QUIC server
does provide significant opportunities to identify the same
client across these services, e.g., the close temporal proximity
between DNS lookups and subsequent connection requests
to QUIC servers. We conclude, that a collusion between
both services can already reduce the client’s anonymity set
based on the timing of the corresponding requests. Moreover,
the client’s source address will usually be the same when
communicating with the DNS resolver and the QUIC server,
which further facilitates the linking of the user’s activities.
Furthermore, the DNS resolver can respond with a unique
server source address upon the client’s DNS query, which
is especially feasible for IPv6 addresses. Subsequently, both
services can use this address to link the user across their
services. Possibly, further opportunities to link users arise from
the usage of DNS record types other than address records (A or
AAAA) such as entries for Encrypted Server Name Indication
(ESNI) for TLS 1.3 [21]. In total, it seems not feasible to
prevent user tracking between DNS provider and QUIC server
operators if these entities collude with each other.
b) Distribution via other QUIC connections: Similar to
the DNS-based scenario, several operators of QUIC servers
can share their clients’ source addresses and the time of the
requests to match user profiles across services. However, web
applications are usually capable of triggering a request to
another URL using a HTTP redirect or hyperlink. This allows
the colluding entities to encode a client identifier within the
used URL. Thus, if the client follows the received HTTP
redirect or hyperlink, both colluding entities can share the
respective client’s profile based on this unique client identi-
fier. Concluding, it does not seem to be feasible to prevent
user tracking across colluding QUIC servers in a real-world
context.
To mitigate the privacy impact of our proposal, we rec-
ommend expiring out-of-band tokens within short periods. As
proposed in [18], ten minutes seem to be a reasonable limit
for comparable mechanisms that enable user tracking.
D. Scalability
The proposed distribution mechanisms require the establish-
ment of trust-relations between different hostnames or even
services. Large corporations such as Google or Cloudflare that
cover several thousands of websites and provide their own
popular DNS resolvers can easily deploy our proposal for their
own services. Furthermore, it seems feasible that large Internet
corporations establish the required trust between each other
based on personal contacts to allow issuing out-of-band tokens
across their services. As a result, this practice would only
benefit the client’s connection establishment with these few
online services, while most online services do not significantly
benefit from the performance improvements achieved via out-
of-band tokens.
To make this proposal available to every web service,
it requires an automated approach to establish the required
trust-relations and subsequently share, update and possibly
revoke the secret keys required for issuing out-of-band tokens.
Possibly, it requires a trusted entity similar to the CA/Browser
Forum which can provide a whitelist of trustworthy DNS
resolvers. This whitelist can be used by QUIC servers to share
their secret keys required for issuing out-band-tokens with
these DNS resolvers.
With respect to out-of-band tokens issued by other QUIC
servers, a deviation of the ACME protocol [1] seems plausible
to automate the process of establishing trust and conducting
the required key management. Here, the QUIC server first
validates the legitimate interest of another QUIC server to
issue out-of-band tokens. Legitimate interest can be argued
if the server, which intends to issue out-of-band tokens serves
hyperlinks or HTTP redirects to the corresponding server, that
consumes the out-of-band validation tokens. If the interest is
valid, both servers will subsequently exchange the required
key material to issue such tokens.
To the best of our knowledge, no protocols suitable for
these tasks exist. Thus, we hope that this brief discussion of
the scalability problem at hand fosters further research and
development on the design of such protocols, that makes out-
of-band validation tokens available to every web service.
V. RELATED WORK
Performance improvements of the QUIC protocol with re-
spect to the performance penalty caused by a stateless retry are
actively discussed within the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF) QUIC working group. So far, these discussions focus
on extending the number of entities that are allowed to issue
address validation tokens for other hostnames either based
on existing TLS trust-relations [17] or based on the source
address from which a respective hostname is served [16]. Both
prior contributions have limited applicability to avoid stateless
retries.
[17] does not mitigate a stateless retry during the first
connection to a member of a group of hostnames that have
an exiting trust-relation with each other. Furthermore, these
groups are usually rather small [20], thus only about 60%
of connections established during the first visit of an average
website can benefit from this approach. However, validation
tokens obtained from a member of such a group can be
considered as trustworthy because these members share secret
cryptographic state with each other such as a private key of a
X.509 certificate.
[16] proposes to bind validation tokens to the address of
the server, similar to the approach of the TCP Fast Open
protocol [5]. This approach is limited as it does not mitigate
a stateless retry upon the initial connection establishment to
a specific server source address and performance gains can
only be realized on subsequent connections to a hostname
served from the same source address. Furthermore, the feature
of connection reuse in HTTP/2 [2] allows using an established
connection to a server at a specific source address to request
resources for another virtual host on the same server. This
feature of HTTP reduces the chance that a client requests
another connection to the same server at the same source
address. Thus, it remains so far unclear to which extend this
proposal improves the status quo.
This work extends the applicability of the discussed related
work because clients can use out-of-band tokens upon the
first connection request to any QUIC server, assuming that
their DNS resolver is capable to provide a corresponding
token. Thus, this proposal outperforms the related work by
saving up to 100% of the stateless retries usually required if a
strict source address validation is enforced. To the best of our
knowledge, this work is the first to propose the distribution of
address validation tokens via DNS.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes out-of-band validation tokens for a
shared address validation between a QUIC server and trusted
entities issuing these tokens. Our evaluation indicates, that
the proposed tokens enable significant performance gains for
clients and servers without affecting the user’s privacy and
communication security.
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